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The Nuclear Collision Course: Can
International Law Be Of Help?
JOHN H.E. FRIED*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the four decades since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the build-up
of nuclear weapons has spiraled beyond the worst fears and most strenu-
ous warnings. Although recent research has revealed that the effects of a
major nuclear war would be even more catastrophic than hitherto ex-
pected (a nuclear night followed by nuclear winter), ever more sophisti-
cated nuclear weapons are being produced and planned. There is the
prospect of a new dimension to the arms race in outer space, competitive
preparations by the superpowers for "star wars." The seemingly axio-
matic conviction that nuclear war is unthinkable has been superceded by
plans for protracted and winnable "limited" nuclear war. The fundamen-
tal question arises: Is the use of nuclear weapons permitted by interna-
tional law?
Self-styled realists consider the question naive; they assert that
states will pay little heed to law when their national interests are at stake.
However, the realists are only able to advocate reliance on intensified
force, and in today's world, intensified force ultimately suggests nuclear
war.
Respect for the rules of international conduct is a basic requirement
for a viable international community.' As Chancellor James Kent said in
1826:
A comprehensive and scientific knowledge of international law is
highly necessary. . .to every gentleman who is animated by liberal
views and a generous ambition to assume stations of high public trust.
It would be exceedingly to the discredit of any person who should be
called to take a share in the councils of the nation, if he should be
found deficient in all the great learning of this law. 2
Without international law (the sum total of treaties, customs and
principles that regulate the mutual conduct of states), the world could
* John H. E. Fried, PH.D., Columbia University; LL.D., Vienna University; Professor
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1. For a searching, non-legalistic analysis, see G. CRAIG & A. GEORGE, FORCE AND STATE-
CRAFT: DIPLOMATIC PROBLEMS OF OUR TIME (1983).
2. 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 19-20 (1826), cited by W. BISHOP JR.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS at 17 (2d ed. 1962).
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not function, just as no society could function without domestic law. As
domestic law deals, in part, with disturbances threatening the domestic
community, so does international law include an elaborate body of rules
concerning war between nations.
For a discussion of the impact which the international law of war 3
must have on governmental policies, some facts should first be recalled:
(1) The international law of war is binding. Governments instruct
their Armed Forces to respect the law of war. As the basic U.S. Army
Field Manual says about the treaties on the law of war which it incorpo-
rates: "the treaty provisions quoted herein must be observed by both mil-
itary and civilian personnel with the same strict regard for both the letter
and the spirit of the law which is required for the Constitution and stat-
utes. . . ." The basic U.S. Air Force Treatise on the conduct of armed
conflict states that:
The law of armed conflict is essentially inspired by the humanitarian
desire of civilized nations to diminish the effects of conflicts .... It
has been said to represent in some measure the minimum standards
of civilization... [Ilts permanence is 'based on a general conscious-
ness of stringent and permanent obligation'. . . .We in the Air Force
constantly benefit from the existence of international law .... I
(2) The international law of war is not imposed either on govern-
ments or on the military. Existing treaty rules were drafted at interna-
tional conferences in collaboration with, and with the approval of, the
military experts of the participating countries. Hence, the rules imply
that the military found it useful to limit the extent of violence permissi-
ble against the enemy, because this equally limits the extent of permissi-
ble violence by the enemy.
(3) History shows that while the destructiveness of military technol-
ogy has increased, so has the condemnation of war. By 1928, the Kellogg-
Briand Pact prohibited war as an instrument of national policy. The U.N.
Charter calls war a scourge. The General Assembly stigmatized a war of
aggression as a "crime against international peace."' The Charter forbids
not only use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any State (except in self-defense "if an armed attack occurs")
but forbids even the threat of force." These fundamental rules also pro-
hibit the use or threat of use of any weapons against another country in
3. It is more precisely called "the law of armed conflict" in order to prevent the subter-
fuge that military hostilities, when called "police action" or the like, are not subject to the
rules of war.
4. DEPT.OF THE ARMY, FM27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE art. 7 (1956). [hereinafter
cited as U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL].
5. DEPT OF THE AIR FORCE, AFP 110-31, INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CONDUCT OF ARMED
CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS 6-5 (1976) (Also known as U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE) [herein-
after cited as U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE].
6. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19), U.N. Doc. A/9619 and Corr. 1 (1974).
7. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2, para. 4, and 51.
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military actions such as a "surgical strike" on any specific object or area
or group of persons, a "demonstration explosion," or an attack in pursuit
of any political aim. These rules prohibit any pre-emptive or anticipatory
attack. As one commentator stated: "[S]omeday tensions between the So-
viet Union and the United States may be so high that the only security
either nation will have against a war of annihilation will be the clear legal
rule prohibiting anticipatory self-defense."
(4) Society's aversion to the cruelty of war (which is characteristic of
our era) is relevant for the interpretation of rules that become binding
when, despite all prohibitions, war occurs. These rules must be inter-
preted restrictively, insofar as they permit violence, and extensively, inso-
far as they forbid violence.
(5) Grave breaches of the law of war are crimes, regardless of whether
or not those responsible for them are tried.
Keeping these considerations in mind, what are the implications of
international law concerning the use of nuclear weapons?
II. FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
A. Nuclear Warfare Violates the Fundamental Rules of Combat
It is sometimes asserted that nuclear weapons are "ordinary weapons
just as any other weapons" and, consequently, mankind must live with
them or, as the case may be, die from them. Obviously, they are not "or-
dinary" weapons. Their effects threaten calamities beyond the capacity of
conventional weapons. As has often been asserted, once the threshold be-
tween conventional and nuclear war is crossed, unparalleled catastrophe
is unavoidable.9
Even accepting, arguendo, that nuclear weapons are like other weap-
ons, this assumption does not show that their use is permissible. To the
contrary, the very assumption proves the illegality of nuclear warfare. For
if nuclear weapons are weapons like any other then the rules for non-
nuclear combat must also apply to nuclear combat. Any rule that prohib-
its the use of conventional weapons must also prohibit the use of nuclear
weapons. The difference is that non-nuclear weapons can be used without
violating the rules of combat, whereas nuclear weapons cannot.
This fact becomes apparent by reviewing the basic rules of combat
laid down in the Hague Regulations of 1907 10, which were confirmed and
8. D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 588
(1983).
9. To point out the basic difference between nuclear and conventional warfare is, of
course, not meant as advocacy for conventional war as the smaller evil. The very assumption
that conventional war is "preferable" implies the inevitability of war. And as long as war
plans provide for mixed conventional-nuclear combat from the onset of hostilities, rapid
escalation into full nuclear war is assured.
10. The Hague Convention Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, 1907,
art. 18 (annex), 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention].
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adapted to modern conditions in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, four
years after the advent of nuclear weapons. Although the Conventions of
1949 make no specific reference to nuclear weapons, it is precisely be-
cause special rules for nuclear weapons were never promulgated that gen-
eral rules which forbid or restrict the use of any weapon must apply to
nuclear weapons.
The ground rule of the entire law of war stipulates that "the right of
belligerents to adopt measures of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.""1
This means that the rules of war, and not the technological possibilities,
determine the limits of permissible violence in war.
Another basic principle of the law of war specifically bans the use of
an entire category of weapons, regardless of whether their use would be
technologically possible or militarily advantageous: "it is especially pro-
hibited to employ arms, projectiles, or materials of a nature to cause un-
necessary suffering." 12
This rule protects not only civilians, but also the military forces
(combatants). The U.S. Air Force Treatise states: "[T]he rule against un-
necessary suffering applies also to the manner of use of a weapon or
method of warfare against combatants or enemy military objectives."' 3
It states further that, "It]he rule prohibiting the use of weapons causing
unncessary suffering or superfluous injury is firmly established in interna-
tional law," going back to the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration which pro-
hibited "the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the suffering
of disabled men or render their death inevitable. '1 4
Since nuclear arms are unquestionably of a nature to cause unneces-
sary suffering, their use is prohibited by this general rule. The prohibition
applies also to the use of accurate "counterforce" nuclear weapons against
"military objectives" (such as ammunition depots and silos where mili-
tary personnel would be hit by them).
Nuclear warfare would also not respect what the International Red
Cross calls "the very basis of the whole law of war," 15 namely, the distinc-
tion between combatants and civilians. It is true that in every war, civil-
ian casualties will occur although non-combatants are, in principle, im-
mune. As the 1976 U.S. Air Force Treatise states: "This immunity of the
civilian population does not preclude unavoidable and incidental civilian
casualties which may occur during attacks against military objectives and
which are not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
11. Id. art. 22.
12. Id. art. 23(e).
13. U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE, supra note 5, at 2.
14. Id.
15. INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS, 4 COMMENTARY TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION 153
(1958)[hereinafter cited as COMMENTARY].
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advantages anticipated." 16
The proposition that "unavoidable and incidental" civilian casualties
may result from otherwise legitimate military action may have to be tol-
erated by the harsh logic of war. But at what point do such incidental
consequences, precisely because they are unavoidable, become so nefari-
ous as to make a military action illegitimate?
The multi-million civilian death toll expected from even a limited
use of tactical nuclear arms cannot be considered "unavoidable and inci-
dental" and hence tolerable. The law of war carefully distinguishes be-
tween permissible destruction and prohibited devastation. It permits the
destruction of military objects, yet it does not permit destruction beyond
the limits it has set. The notions that a purpose of war is destruction for
destruction's sake; that destruction is a success in itself; that the more
desolation caused, the better; that war may aim at preventing the enemy
country's recovery after the war's end - are anathema to the honorable
profession of arms. Three important provisions of the law of war state:
(a) Prohibition of indiscriminate destruction: "it is especially forbid-
den. . .to destroy. . .the enemy's property, unless such destruction. . .be
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war."1 "Property" here
means any property movable or immovable, public or private, from a sin-
gle object to an entire city.
(b) Prohibition of attacking or bombarding undefended places: "The
attack or bombardment by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings
or buildings which are undefended is prohibited." 11 Thanks to this rule,
Rome and Paris were saved from destruction in World War II when they
were declared undefended, or open cities. Such cities could not be ex-
empted from radioactive fallout caused by nuclear strategic area bomb-
ings or tactical precision attacks on defended places.
(c) Prohibiton of attacks on civilian hospitals: "Civilian hospi-
tals. . .may in no circumstances be the object of attack, but shall at all
times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict." 19 Obvi-
ously, hospitals could not be protected against radioactive fallout.
B. "Prisoners Will Not Be Taken"
The law of war states that members of the armed forces have the
right to surrender, individually or in units, however large, and become
prisoners of war. Thereupon, the enemy must provide them with shelter,
food, medical care, clothing, etc. "until their final release and repatria-
16. U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE, supra note 5, at 6.
17. Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 23(g).
18. Id. art. 24.
19. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 18, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. [hereinafter cited
as Civilian Convention].
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tion. ' 'So This safety valve guaranteed by the law of war, which even in the
fury of World War II saved millions of lives, would be closed in nuclear
war. In the U.S.-Indochina war, when the U.S. combined intense conven-
tional air warfare with ground warfare, large numbers of Indochinese
soldiers were still taken prisoner. But, in long-distance nuclear war, the
possiblity to surrender would not exist. The situation would be the same
as that of a declaration that "no quarter will be given." Such a declara-
tion is among the methods of war "especially forbidden" by the Hague
Regulations. 21
C. Nuclear Warfare Would Violate the Immunity of Neutral States
Nuclear warfare would not only transgress the law which regulates
combat between belligerent states, but would also transgress the rules
regulating the behavior of belligerents toward neutral states. The most
sacrosanct of these is the time-honored axiom that "[the territory of
neutral Powers is inviolate." 22 Disregard for this immunity of neutrals is
considered a particularly grave outrage.
The 1976 U.S. Air Force Treatise states that "particular weapons or
methods of warfare may be [considered] prohibited because of their indis-
criminate effects. . .Indiscriminate weapons are those incapable of being
controlled, through design or function. . . . Uncontrollable ef-
fects. . .may include injury to the civilian population of other States as
well as injury to an enemy's civilian population." 23
The Secretary-General's Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons
declares: "In a nuclear war. . .all nations in the world would experience
grave physical consequence from radioactive fallout. . .and during the
decades after a major nuclear war, fallout would take a toll of millions
worldwide in present and future generations." 24
It would be sophistry to assert that the catastrophe predicted for
countries uninvolved in the nuclear conflict would not violate the immu-
nity of their territory guaranteed by Hague Convention V. 25 Even if nu-
clear warfare could be conducted between belligerents in obedience to the
rules of war, the disastrous consequences for the neutrals would prohibit
it.
The situation of certain neutral states, namely those which harbor
nuclear weapons of a belligerent state on their territory, is particularly
20. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 5, 6
U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
21. Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 23(d).
22. Id. art. 1.
23. U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE, supra note 5, at 6-3.
24. Comprehensive study on Nuclear Weapons, Report by the Secretary General, para.
495, U.N. Doc. A/35/392 (1980). The study calls nuclear weapons "a perpetual menace to
human society." id. para. 490.
25. Hague Convention, supra note 10.
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serious. They are exposed to unintended radiation effects of nuclear war-
fare between others and risk that the belligerent's opponent will deny
their status as neutrals.
For a state wishing to remain neutral in a war between others, it is
not enough to abstain from fighting on either side. In order to claim the
status of a neutral, the state must fulfill certain obligations. First, it must
not allow "belligerents to use its territory as a base of operations in
war."2 The Hague Convention demands that "[a] neutral Power which
receives on its territory troops belonging to the belligerent armies shall
intern them, as far as possible, at a distance from the theatre of war." 27
Logically, and by universal practice, the arms of the interned foreign
troops must also be seized. As the U.S. Army Field Manual states, these
troops "must be disarmed." 28 Since, as the Manual explains, this refers
to their "munitions, arms, vehicles, and other equipment," 29 nuclear
weapons must also be seized.
These obligations would have to be fulfilled by any European NATO
country which would decide to remain neutral in the event of a U.S.-So-
viet war." However, NATO has systematically combined and interwoven
its members' preparations for instantaneous war, and nuclear weapons
are avaiable to U.S. forces on the soil of several European NATO coun-
tries. At the start of a U.S.-Soviet war, those claiming the status of neu-
trals would therefore have to seize such arms within minutes. This, of
course, would be impossible.
The Soviet Union would have to expect that U.S. nuclear weapons
deployed in NATO countries would be used against it or its allies. Hence,
the Soviet Union could rightly claim that those countries, although they
do not actively participate in the war, do not have neutral status and it
26. 2 L. OPPENHEIM & H. LAUDERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 727 (7th ed. 1952).
27. Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 11.
28. U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 533.
29. Id. art. 536.
30. See NATO Treaty, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1793, TIAS No. 2678. " If an armed
attack on any NATO member occurs, each shall take "such action as it deems necessary,
including the use of armed force." (Art. 5). Hence, each NATO member has the sovereign
right to take no action, military or otherwise. Furthermore, in order to exclude the interpre-
tation that any NATO member must go to war whenever any other NATO member goes to
war, the Treaty underscores the obvious, namely that each NATO member would take the
fatal decision to go to war "in accordance with its constitutional processes." (Art. 11) Evi-
dently, neither the U.S. nor any other country would, without such safeguard, have entered
the NATO alliance.
It should also be noted that the NATO Treaty does not specify the country or countries
against which it is to apply. While having primarily the Soviet Union in mind, the Treaty
applies to an attack by any State against a NATO State in the NATO area. Had the treaty
established an automatic obligation to go to war, this would, in case of an attack by NATO
member A against NATO member B, scurrilously require the other NATO member States
to fight NATO member A. In fact, this could conceivably have occurred already if Turkey's
1974 invasion of Cyprus and subsequent occupation of a large part of the island had led to
war between NATO members Greece and Turkey.
1985
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
may therefore destroy those weapons. 3
This principle applies equally to the non-NATO countries of the
world that wish to stay out of a U.S.-Soviet war, but harbor U.S. nuclear
weapons. 32 It also applies to Warsaw-Pact and non-Warsaw-Pact States
in which Soviet nuclear weapons may be located. Thus, a U.S.-Soviet war
in Europe would, from its inception, threaten to assume global dimen-
sions because both sides would feel compelled to eliminate the danger of
weapons available to the opponent in third countries.
D. Fate of Enemy Areas "Won" by Nuclear Attack
It has been necessary to conclude that the law of combat and the law
of neutrality prohibit nuclear warfare. The same is true of the law of bel-
ligerent occupation.
The law of belligerent occupation is based on the proposition that it
is the very aim of war to penetrate and thereupon to occupy parts or even
the whole of the enemy's territory. From the moment of occupation, and
for as long as the occupation lasts, "the authority of the legitimate power
[has] in fact passed into the hands of the occupant.""3 The occupant must
"take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possi-
ble, public order and safety." "To the fullest extent of the means availa-
ble to it, the occupying power has the duty of ensuring the food and med-
ical supplies of the population."3 5 The occupant must "in particular,
bring in [from outside the occupied territory] the necessary foodstuffs,
medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory
are inadequate." 36
31. However, if the U.S. had not used nuclear weapons first (from whatever location) ,
the Soviet Union would by its own no first-use pledge be prevented from using nuclear arms
for the purpose.
32. The situation can be illustrated by referring to the Philippines and Japan. Two of
the most important overseas American installations are in the Philippines. The Subic Naval
Base is the U.S. Navy's largest logistical support base in the Western Pacific, and Clark Air
Base (headquarters of the 13th Air Force) is the largest U.S. airbase in East Asia; the com-
plex of bases is staffed by 15,400 military and Department of Defense personnel. See W.
Bello, Springboards for Intervention, Instruments for Nuclear War, SourrHEAST CHRONICLE,
at 3,5 (Apr. 1983).
In Japan, the U.S. presence consists of some 50,000 troops provided with aircraft, and
major facilities such as naval ports and communications, command and control stations. A
Marine Corps station, some 11,000 strong, is located at Iwakuni, 20 miles from Hiroshima.
See G. Mitchell, Rearming Japan, IN THESE TIMEs, at 12,13 ( Aug. 2, 1985).
The U.S. policy not to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons also applies to
the Philippines and Japan. If none are there, they could in a crisis be brought in quickly,
whereupon the obligation of the host nation, to seize those weapons and 'intern the U.S.
forces ( pursuant to Hague Convention), would apply but could hardly be fulfilled.
33. Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 42.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Civilian Convention, supra note 19, art. 55. "Article 55, Geneva Civilian Con-
vention, confirming extensive responsibility for the welfare of the occupied territory, im-
poses upon the occupying power the duty of ensuring food and medical supplies to the best
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The vast obligations of the occupant (to which numerous others
listed in the law of war would have to be added) apply to "the occupied
territory," and hence also to occupied areas not directly affected by com-
bat but where these supplies are needed.
However, the phrase, "[t]o the fullest extent of the means available
to [the Occupant]" " qualifies the obligation in any occupied area. The
significance of the qualification must be considered. In particular, the In-
ternational Red Cross Committee's Commentary states:
The rule that the Occupying Power is responsible for the provision of
supplies for the population places that Power under a definite obliga-
tion to maintain at a reasonable level the material conditions under
which the population of the occupied territory lives. The inclusion of
the phrase 'to the fullest extent of the means available to it' shows,
however, that the authors of the Convention did not wish to disregard
the material difficulties with which the Occupying Power might be
faced in wartime (financial and transport problems, etc) but the Occu-
pying Power is nevertheless under an obligation to utilize all the
means at its disposal. 8
The Commentary then underscores the extent of the obligation:
"Supplies for the population are not limited to food, but include medical
supplies and any article necessary to support life."39 In addition,
[t]he duty of ensuring supplies is reinforced by an obligation to bring
in the necessary articles when the resources of the occupied territory
are inadequate. . . . The Convention does not lay down the method
by which this is to be done. The occupying authorities retain complete
freedom of action in regard to this, and are thus in a position to take
the circumstances of the moment into account. 40
The Commentary concludes by suggesting some concrete measures
that the occupant should take "in good time" "I to facilitate imports to
the occupied territory, for example, arranging for free transit subject to
the occupant's verification and control.
The significance of the Commentary lies in the emphasis it puts on
the legal obligation of belligerents not to let helpless enemy populations
perish but "to support their life" 42 as well as possible by potentially ma-
jor undertakings. The question arises whether the rules of belligerent oc-
cupation become irrelevant when, under the conditions of nuclear war,
of its capabilities, even if it has to bring these in from outside the territory." U.S. AIR FORCE
TREATISE, supra note 5, at 41.
37. Id.
38. See COMMENTARY, supra note 15, at 153.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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they can hardly be obeyed. How could either superpower, upon becoming
the occupant, take "the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary
to combat the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics" ,4 from
thousands of miles away and "to the fullest extent of the means available
to it," 4, as stipulated in the Geneva Civilians Convention? The super-
powers' own medical personnel and medical supplies, decimated by the
war, could not even begin to take care of the casualties at home. A 1984
Report of the World Health Organization estimates that:
[t]he detonation of even a single 1-megaton bomb over a large city
would kill more than 1.5 million people and injure as many. A 'lim-
ited' nuclear war with smaller tactical nuclear weapons totalling 20
megatons, aimed at military targets in a relatively densely populated
area would exact a toll of about 9 million dead and seriously injured,
of whom more than 8 million would be civilians, an all-out nuclear
war... would result in more than 1000 million deaths and 1000 mil-
lion injured people... Therefore, the only approach to the treatment
of health effects of nuclear explosions is primary prevention of such
explosions, that is, the prevention of atomic war.4 1
This counsel by W.H.O. experts is even more justified by two other
aspects of nuclear war which these experts do not address directly.
First, the primary purpose of occupying enemy territory during war
is to deprive the enemy of the capability of using the territory and its
resources for military purposes; to wage war from it. To achieve this aim,
it is not necessary, and therefore not legitimate under the military con-
cept of "economy of force," 46 always to inflict great damage on that terri-
tory or its population. But a no-occupation strategy could not be carried
out with restraint; it could only make the territory militarily useless to
the enemy by devasting it.
Second, even after the end of nuclear hostilities, the "victor" would
find its own country in a disastrous situation, and be unable to undertake
the massive relief actions desperately needed by the defeated side, such
as those rendered after World War II to the defeated Axis countries by
the Allies - notably by the United States which was unscathed by the
war.
Indeed, the cruelest irony of long-distance nuclear war is that there
would be no occupation of enemy territory. Bombardments by long-range
missles and bombers are capable of destroying their targets (which would
inevitably also produce large-scale lethal radiation beyond their targets)
but are evidently incapable of occupying territory. In short, the enemy
areas subjected to those bombardments would not be occupied because
43. Civilian Convention, supra note 36, art. 56.
44. Id.
45. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS IN MEDICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC HEALTH: EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR
ON HEALTH AND HEALTH SERVICES 5-6 (1984).
46. U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE, supra note 5, at 5-8.
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this is neither intended nor physically possible. The survivors would be
relinquished to their own misery. Anarchy, famine and epidemics would
be left unchecked. This aspect of nuclear war is hardly ever mentioned.
47
No rule of international law obligates a belligerent to occupy enemy
territory which his attacks have "made ripe" for occupation. The law of
war does not prescribe military strategy, but it sets the limits of permissi-
ble strategy. To occupy ("conquer") enemy territory has been the essen-
tial goal in war, the very purpose of strategy, the pride of generals, and
the hoped for justification of the sacrifices imposed by war, from Troy to
Stalingrad, and from Richmond to Hanoi. Yet the question now is
whether nuclear war technology makes occupation of enemy territory un-
feasible, and therefore grants a belligerent the right to devastate enemy
territory and take no responsibility for the fate of the survivors.
In fact, nuclear war would deprive the attacked opponent of the pal-
liative that has made even the worst wars (until now) somehow surviv-
able, namely, the occupation of the enemy territory "won" during the
war, whereupon the occupant has had to provide the survivors with the
essentials of life.
To leave the survivors of nuclear attack to oblivion is both morally
repulsive and legally impermissible. It condemns possibly millions of peo-
ple to horrible suffering subsequent to exposing them, illegally, to the at-
tack itself. Moreover, the law of war (the Preamble to the Hague Regula-
tions IV) 48 generally forbids methods of warfare which, although not
specifically forbidden, are contrary to "the usages established among civi-
lized peoples, the laws of humanity, or the dictates of the public con-
science." 11
F. The Law of Humanity and the Dictates of the Public Conscience
Forbid Nuclear War
We have so far surveyed specific rules of the international law on
armed conflict which make nuclear warfare illegal. In addition, nuclear
warfare is implicitly forbidden by a general rule appearing in the Hague
Regulations of 1907.50 The makers of these Regulations, statesmen, gener-
als and jurists, intended to create a truly comprehensive code of the law
of war. However, knowing that the development of war technology was
unforeseeable, they agreed that the Regulations had to provide for future
developments, so as not to become incomplete and obsolete. Therefore,
they inserted a general clause into the Preamble to the Regulations,
known as the "Martens Clause."'" The Martens Clause stipulates that if
methods of warfare are not foreseen by the Regulations, but are contrary
47. U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ANNUAL REPORT (1980).
48. Hague Convention, supra note 10.
49. Id.
50. Hague Convention, supra note 10.
51. Id.
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to "the usages established among civilized peoples, to the laws of human-
ity, to the dictates of the public conscience,"52 then they are forbidden by
those overriding standards themselves, without the need for any addi-
tional treaty.
This principle, which a U.S. Nuremberg Tribunal called "more than
a pious declaration," namely, "a legal yardstick," " is repeated in all ma-
jor treaties on the law of war concluded since the advent of the nuclear
age.
The urgent warnings by statesmen, religious leaders, medical authori-
ties, physicists, environmentalists, and professionals in many other fields,
including the military, 54 and the intensity and ubiquity of the general
protest movement "dictate" that governments abstain from initiating nu-
clear war.
Considering the obligation to respect the conscience of the world and
remembering the more specific demands of the law of war discussed
above, nuclear warfare is manifestly prohibited by international law. 55
Yet, in spite of all this there exist arguments - and they are widely ac-
cepted - claiming the permissibility of nuclear warfare.
G. Arguments Asserting that Nuclear War is Permissible
The most influential of these arguments is that there exists no treaty
which specifically outlaws the use of nuclear weapons. Hence, it is main-
tained, as long as such a treaty does not exist, there is no law that would
forbid nuclear warfare.56
52. Id.
53. IX TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No.10, , Nuernberg October 1946-April 1949, at 1340 [hereinafter
cited as T.W.C.].
54. See, e.g., the statements of American, British, Dutch, French, Greek, Italian, Portu-
guese and West German retired generals and admirals. GENERALE FOR DEN FRIEDEN (G.
Kade ed. 1982).
55. "It seems inescapable that nuclear warfare is contrary to the core precepts of inter-
national law." B.H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Illegality in Con-
text, 13 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 5 (1983). Professor Weston reached the same conclusion in
his longer study: Nuclear Weapons Versus International Law: A Contextual Reassessment,
28 McGiLL L.J. 542-590, at 562 (1983).
Professor Wolfgang Daubler points out that the view that existing international law
unambiguously prohibits the first use (unzweideutiges verbot des Ersteinsatzes) of nuclear
weapons is "almost universally shared by the science of international law" (fast einhellige
Auffassung der Volkerrechts-Wissenschaft). W. DAUBLER, STATIONIERING UND GRINDGESETZ
54, 187 (1982). See also, J. Goldblat, Nuclear War Cannot Be Conducted with Obedience to
the Rules of International Law, BULL. OF PEACE PROPOSALS 317 (Apr. 1982); see also papers
presented by members of the American Society of International Law at a Conference on
Nuclear Weapons and Law, 7 NOVA L.J. (1982); Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy,
Statement on the Illegality of Nuclear Weapons (rev. ed. 1984).
56. See, e.g., Almond, Nuclear Weapons are Legal Tools, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIEN-
TISTs 32-35 (May, 1985).
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The official position of the U.S. is expressed in its two most impor-
tant military texts. The U.S. Army Field Manual states: "The use of ex-
plosive 'atomic weapons,' whether by air, sea or land forces, cannot as
such be regarded as violative of international law in the absence of any
customary rule of international law or international convention restricting
their employement. ' 5 7 The words "as such" can only mean that the re-
strictions contained in the law of war, especially those of the Hague Reg-
ulations of 1907 and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, apply also to what the
Manual calls "explosive atomic weapons", but which evidently includes
all nuclear weapons. Their employment is not illegal because they are nu-
clear weapons ("as such"). Rather, it is illegal because international law
makes illegal the employment of any weapon that is "of a nature to cause
unnecessary suffering. "58
This is confirmed by the analogous formulation in the U.S. Air Force
Treatise which states: "The use of explosive nuclear weapons, whether by
air, sea or land forces, cannot be regarded as violative of existing interna-
tional law in the absence of any international rule of law restricting their
employment."5 9 Here the words "as such" in the 1956 U.S. Army Field
Manual are replaced by the immediately following sentence: "Nuclear
weapons can be directed against military objectives as can conventional
weapons."6 0
The legal situation described in these statements should be clear:
since no specific ban against nuclear weapons exists, the general rules of
war apply to them. However, the U.S. texts conclude from this premise
that nuclear weapons can be used in obedience to those rules. Such a
conclusion is incorrect, even for limited or tactical warfare.
The unnecessasry suffering of enemy combatants and the risks to ci-
vilians and friendly forces anticipated in even limited nuclear war, can be
seen from a provision in the 1976 U.S. Army Field Manual Operations:
A soldier exposed to 650 rads... can be expected to die in a few
weeks under battlefield conditions. Exposure in the 100 rad region
usually has little effect. Accordingly, in conventional nuclear combat it
would be prudent to subject front line enemy to 3,000-8,000 rads or
more, enemy to the rear to 650-3,000 rads, and avoid subjecting
friendly forces and civilians to an unacceptable dose level (100 or
more rads).6'
Another influential argument for the permissibility of nuclear war is
the "total war" argument. The term "total war" may mean different
things. If it means a total effort to defeat the aggressor (such as, total
mobilization, drastic rationing of consumer goods, severe penalties for ab-
57. U.S. ARMY FMLD MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 35.
58. Hague Convention, supra note 10.
59. U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE, supra note 5, at 5.
60. Id.
61. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMy, FM 100-5, OPERATIONS 32 (1976).
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senteeism, prohibition of the use of motorcars for non-war pruposes), it is
an entirely legitimate policy. However, if it means a war of total ferocity,
it is what the Nuremberg International Tribunal condemned as the "Nazi
conception of total war:"
In the Nazi conception of 'total war'. . .the moral ideas underlying
the conventions which seek to make war more humane are no longer
regarded as having force or validity... and so, freed from the re-
straining influence of international law, the aggressive war is con-
ducted by the Nazi leaders in the most barbaric way. Accordingly,
War Crimes were committed when and wherever the Fuhrer and his
close associates thought them to be advantageous.2
The clich6 that "this is an era of total war," has ominous implica-
tions. It fosters a nihilistic contempt of morality and law. It is brutalizing
because it condones and accustoms society to mass atrocities. It is limit-
less: how much license does total war grant? It is unpatriotic because the
claim of one own country's right to behave barbarously against the enemy
authorizes the enemy to behave barbarously in return. Worst of all, it
may nourish the belief that a nuclear holocaust is inevitable.
Finally, there is an argument which claims that "restrained nuclear
warfare" would be rationally justifiable because it would limit the casual-
ties and destruction to "acceptable" dimensions. Apart from the fact that
restrained nuclear war would still be illegal, it cannot be assumed that
such war would remain restrained. The late George B. Kistiakowski, Sci-
ence Advisor to three U.S. Presidents, stated it was "totally unrealistic"
to assume that a superpower nuclear war could be "controlled and lim-
ited," even under the counterforce doctrine, which intends to avoid direct
attacks on population centers. "[Ilt may start that way, but with millions
of compatriots among the casualties from the counterforce strikes, with
much of the military communications and command centers out of con-
trol. . .the launching of warheads will continue and accelerate with less
and less central control. . . . Thus, as an inevitable consequence of a lim-
ited nuclear war between the superpowers, the holocaust would come, the
organized national societies would cease to function. . . . " Kistiakowsky
went on to quote Krushchev's prediction that "the living will envy the
dead," and added that this view is shared "by a large majority of senior
statesmen and military leaders. "64
62. 1 TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL,
NUREMBERG, November 1945-October 1946, 277.
63. Kistiakowsky, Can a Limited Nuclear War be Won?, THE DEFENSE MONITOR, at 3,4
Oct. 1981).
64. Id. See also ZUCKERMAN, NUCLEAR ILLUSION AND REALITY 67 (1982): "escalation to
all-out nuclear war is all but implicit in the concept of fighting a field war with 'tactical' and
'theatre' nuclear weapons." (quoting B.H. LIDDELL HART, DETERRENT AND DEFENSE 61
(1960)). The use of 'small' nuclear weapons to stop advancing troops would most likely esca-
late into "an illimitable and suicidal H-bomb devastation of countries and cities; the initial
employment of nuclear weapons would rapidly escalate into an all-out nuclear war between
the two alliances." Lodgaard, Nuclear Disengagement in Europe, 14 BULL. OF PEACE PRO-
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III. THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY NECESSITY
Contrary to the concept of "total war," which is unknown to the law
of war, the concept of "military necessity" - it may also be called "mili-
tary emergency" - does exist in the law of war.
The meaning of the concept of military necessity was assiduously de-
bated at the Nuremberg trials. Some defendants admitted that their ac-
tions in World War II violated the rules of war, but were excusable be-
cause these actions had been necessary in the emergency situation in
which Germany found itself. The three U.S. Nuremberg Tribunals that
were faced with this plea answered it unqualifiedly:
(1) Judgment in the Krupp case (31 July 1949):
The contention that the rules and customs of war can be violated if
either party is hard pressed in war must be rejected .... It is an es-
sence of war that one or the other side must lose, and the experienced
generals and statesmen knew this when they drafted the rules and
customs of land warfare. In short, these rules and customs of warfare
are designed specifically for all phases of war .... The claim that
they can be wantonly-and at the sole discretion of any one belliger-
ent-disregarded when he considers his own situation to be critical,
means nothing more or less than to abrogate the laws and customs of
war entirely.65
(2) Judgment in the Fieldmarshal List, et al. (Hostages) case (19
February 1948):
As we have previously stated in this opinion, the rules of international
law must be followed even if it results in the loss of a battle or even a
war. Expediency or necessity cannot warrant their violation."
(3) Judgment in the Fieldmarshal von Leeb, et al. (High Command)
case (27 October 1948):
It has been contended in this case that military necessity includes the
right to do anything that contributes to the winning of a war....
[S]uch a view would eliminate all humanity and decency and all law
from the conduct of war and is a contention which this Tribunal repu-
diates as contrary to the accepted usages of civilized nations.6"
These statements, made in reference to what is now called conventional
PosALs 209 (1983) (quoting General Rogers). There is no "persuasive reason to believe that
any use of nuclear weapons, even on the smallest scale, could reliably be expected to remain
limited . . . even the most restrained battlefield use would be enormously destructive to
civilian life and property .... Any use of nuclear weapons in Europe, by the [NATO] Alli-
ance or against it, carries with it a high and inescapable risk of escalation into the general
nuclear war which would bring ruin to all and victory to none." Bundy, Kennan, McNamara
and Smith, Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance, FoREIGN AFFAIRS 9 (Spring 1982).
65. T.W.C., supra note 53, at 1347.
66. Id. at 1272.
67. Id. at 541; Also cited in U.S. ARMY, PUB. No. 27-161-2, U.S. ARMY PUBLICATIONs 248
(Oct. 1962).
1985
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
war, are even more valid for the nuclear weapons age.
The instructions of the U.S. military establishment on the concept of
military necessity are clear. The Air Force defines it as "the principle
which justifies measures of regulated force not forbidden by international
law" and warns that it "is not the German doctrine, Kriegsraison, assert-
ing that military necessity could justify any measures-even in violation
of the laws of war-when the necessities of the situation purportedly jus-
tified it."6 The U.S. Army Field Manual also stresses that military ne-
cessity justifies only "measures not forbidden by international law" and
adds that the laws of war "have been developed and framed with consid-
eration for the concept of military necessity," 9 i.e., that these laws have
themselves established which legitimate measures may become necessary
in war.
Our era's aversion to war is so deep that it can engender a desire to
punish the aggressor by all means available. Such emotion overlooks the
truism that the decision to make war is commonly made by a small num-
ber of policy-makers. An American Nuremberg Tribunal, speaking of the
"cataclysmic catastrophe" caused by the Third Reich's aggressive wars,
reasoned:
International law condemns those who, due to their actual power to
shape and influence the policy of their nations, prepare for, or lead
their country into or in an aggressive war... [b]ut those under them
cannot be punished for the crimes of others. The misdeed of the pol-
icy-makers is all the greater in as much as they use the great mass of
the soldiers and officers to carry out an international crime; however,
the individual soldier or officer below the policy level is but the policy
maker's instrument.7 0
The present conventional weapons arsenals guarantee a more cata-
clysmic catastrophe than World War II. Adding nuclear arms to this
stockpile would not magnify the revenge against the guilty decision-mak-
ers, but instead would victimize the armed forces and the peoples of all
nations.
IV. DANGER OF ACCIDENTAL, UNINTENDED NUCLEAR WAR
The most ominous threat posed to the world is the fact that nuclear
war could be triggered, and was on some occasions almost triggered, be-
cause computers erroneously reported enemy nuclear missiles or bombers
to be on the way, or because human beings misinterperted computer re-
ports and messages from sensors planted in various parts of the earth and
from observation devices in outer space.
If it is pointed out that nuclear war technology leaves no alteration to
68. U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE, supra note 5, at 1.
69. U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 3.
70. T.W.C., supra note 53, at 489.
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reliance on such intrinsically unreliable determinants, the dilemma can be
avoided only by the recognition that such type of warfare is forbidden by
elementary standards of legality and morality.
V. NUCLEAR REPRISAL AGAINST FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Reprisals are actions which are in themselves unlawful, but which be-
come lawful when taken in response to unlawful actions by the other side.
There can be no doubt that "the institutions of the reprisal is one of the
most horrible aspects of the laws of armed combat. But in time of war it
provides for almost the only sanction on violation of the law."'
The rules of the Geneva Civilian Convention of 194972 prohibit repri-
sals against civilians in enemy-occupied territories, but "do not protect
civilians who are under the control of their own countries, '73 i.e., those
rules which do not protect the civilian population in the belligerent coun-
tries. This is also the view of the Red Cross.74 However, the radiation
caused by nuclear weapons used in reprisal would have the same effect on
the civilian population of either side. A tragic dilemma exists in that
there is no military method, except nuclear response, to force the first
user (who by his first-use has shown his disregard of the law) to discon-
tinue his nuclear attack. All plans for nuclear war take for granted the
right of nuclear response to first-use, because proportionate reprisal is re-
quired by elementary military logic and legitimized by the law of war.
Without the right of nuclear counter-attack, there would be unilateral nu-
clear war; the opponent who has built up his nuclear deterrence capacity
for self-defense would be virtually defenseless.7"
On the other hand, it is questionable whether nuclear reprisal could
achieve the very purpose of reprisal, namely, to induce the opponent to
discontinue its illegal behavior. Instead, nuclear reprisal might induce the
71. STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST. [SIPRI], THE LAW OF WAR AND DUBIOUS
WEAPONS 47 (1976). "Reprisals serve as an ultimate legal sanction or law enforcement mech-
anism... to force an adversary to stop its extra-legal activity." See also U.S. Am FoRcE
TREATISE, supra note 5.
72. Civilian Convention, supra note 19.
73. U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE, supra note 5, at 4.
74. See COMMENTARY, supra note 15, at 45-47, 228 (1958). See also Diplomatic Confer-
ence on the Reaffirmation & Devel. of Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict
Protocol I [1977] U.N. JUsID. Y.B. 95, U.N. Doc ST/LEG/SER.C/15. This protocol extends
the prohibitions of reprisals against civilians in enemy-occupied countries to the civilian
population in the belligerents' own countries. However, except for China (which acceded to
Protocol I on Sept. 14, 1983, with effect as of March 14, 1984), the nuclear-weapon states
have not yet become parties to the treaty. (Information Service of the U.N. Treaty Section,
Sept. 4, 1985).
75. An examination by a Finnish scholar of over a dozen authoritative studies showed
that only two denied the right of nuclear reprisal: Charlier, Questions Juridiques Soulevees
Par l'evolution de la Science Atomique, 91 RECUFJL DE COURs 357 (1957); Brownlie, Some
Legal Aspects of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 14 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 445 (1965); Rosas,
International Law and the Use of Nuclear Weapons, in EssAYs IN HONOUR OF ERIK CAS-
TREN 77 (1979).
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first user to intensify and accelerate its nuclear attacks, although the law
of war forbids counter-reprisal. Yet it remains true that if the victim of
the first-use of nuclear weapons were deprived of the right to respond in
kind, it would also be deprived of the right of response to consecutive
nuclear attack. Ultimately, the country might have to accept the ever
greater destruction of its territory with passivity.
The only way to solve the tragic dilemma is to prevent the first-use
of nuclear arms. Without first-use, there can be no subsequent use, and
the question about the legality of nuclear reprisal becomes moot.
VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF No FIRST-USE PLEDGE
There exists a remedy for the fear of first-use of nuclear weapons. It
obviates the need for the time consuming and laborious negotiation and
subsequent ratifications of a treaty. The goal is obtainable by formal dec-
larations which governments can make unilaterally at any time, and
which, if they wish, become binding at once.
The legally binding character of states' unilateral declarations, if
given publicly and with an intent to be bound, was reasserted by the In-
ternational Court of Justice in 1974, in a case that involved the testing of
nuclear weapons:
Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it
is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should be-
come bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the dec-
laration the character of a legal undertaking .... Any undertaking of
this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even
though not made within the context of international negotiations, is
binding.7
So far, two nuclear-weapon states have made such declarations;
China in 1965 and the Soviet Union in 1982. The Soviet Union declared
that "[t]he U.S.S.R. assumes an obligation not to be the first to use nu-
clear weapons. ' '7
76. Nuclear Tests(Aust. & N.Z. v. Fr.) 1974 ICJ 253, 257. The Court stated this in its
judgment in the Nuclear Tests case in which Australia and New Zealand contended that
French nuclear tests in the Pacific were illegal because France had publicly declared not to
make them. For a critique of the Court's stand as being too absolute, see Rubin, The Inter-
national Legal Effects of Unilateral Declarations, 71 AM J. INT'L L. 1 (1977). For a reply to
this critique see Sicault, Du Charactere Obligatoire des Engagements Unilateraux en Droit
Internaitonal Publique 83 REVUE GENERALE DE DRoIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIQUE 3 (1979).
77. The full text of Foreign Minister Gromyko's announcement at the 2nd U.N. Special
Session on Disarmament on June 7, 1982 reads: "Guided by the desire to do all in its power
to deliver the people from the threat of nuclear devastation and ultimately to exclude its
very possibility from the life of mankind, the Soviet Union solemnly declares: The Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics assumes an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.
This obligation shall become effective immediately from the rostrum of the U.N. General
Assembly." U.N. Doc. PUR/A/S-12, PV 12, 21-52, reprinted in, H.JAcK, DISARM-OR DIE 43
(1983).
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The objection that such a pledge is unenforceable is meaningless, for
enforcement, in the sense of "punishment," is relevant only after an obli-
gation is broken. If the no first-use pledge were broken by a first-use
against a nuclear-weapons state, enforcement would, with virtual cer-
tainty, come in the form of nuclear response. If the pledge (which is ad-
dressed to all states) was broken by a first-use against a non-nuclear-
weapons state, any nuclear-weapons state would have the right of nuclear
response under the principle of collective self-defense. A treaty could
threaten no more compelling enforcement.
If, in contrast, the term "enforcement" is used to denote the intent to
assure observance of an obligation before it is broken, by threatening
"punishment" in case of non-observance, then again the pledge neither
adds to nor detracts from the threat. The Soviet, as well as the Chinese,
no first-use pledge neither promises nor expects any renunciation of the
right to nuclear reprisal (second-use).
These considerations address the objection that the Soviet Union
could benefit from breaking or withdrawing its no first-use pledge. There
have been assertions that the pledge is a ruse to lull the West into a false
sense of security, in order to improve the chances for a Soviet first strike.
But, the pledge need not and certainly does not diminish the vigilance of
the Soviet Union's potential adversaries, nor does the pledge in the pre-
sent climate of deep mutual distrust influence the preparations of either
side for nuclear war. In short, if the pledge were broken or rescinded, the
legal and factual situation would be the same as if no pledge had been
made.
This, however, does not mean that the pledge is useless. Whereas the
deliberate unleashing of superpower nuclear war is altogether improbable,
the possibility of accidental first-use has become even more threatening
by the systematic preparations for instantaneous nuclear response. Con-
sequently, the time for reasoned reflection and response is being extin-
guished, when the aim should be to expand that precious time. The sig-
nificant benefit of a mutual no first-use pledge would be the psychological
readiness to see the approach - and even the detonation - of a nuclear
weapon as the result of human or machine failure, or as the work of ter-
rorists or unauthorized subalterns. That readiness, and the resulting con-
clusion that a nuclear "counter" attack under such circumstances would
be an irremediable mistake, might save the world from a nuclear
holocaust.
The NATO refusal to reciprocate the Soviet's no first-use pledge does
not imply the intention to start nuclear or conventional war. But as long
as NATO insists on preserving the option of a first-use, the Soviet Union
will have less reason to assume that a first nuclear strike against it was
unintended, and might consider it necessary to act on the assumption
that the strike was intended. A mutual no first-use pledge can, as much as
humanly possible, guarantee the prevention of the ultimate blasphemy -
an unintended end of civilization.
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VII. CAN THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE DIVERT THE NUCLEAR
COLLISION COURSE?
The Strategic Defense Initiative (S.D.I.), emphasizing the unaccept-
able risks posed by offensive nuclear weapons, calls for a huge endeavor
to eliminate this danger through an arms system that would destroy nu-
clear weapons in outer space, before they can hit the earth. Announcing
the scheme in his television speech on March 23, 1983, President Reagan
expressed the expectation that this would make nuclear weapons "impo-
tent" and "obsolete" and free the American people of the fear of nuclear
war. To accomplish this would, indeed, be a historic breakthrough.
The project raises fundamental questions. First, if S.D.I. is techno-
logically feasible (which critics deny), would it really protect the Ameri-
can people against Soviet nuclear weapons? The S.D.I. does not make
such a claim. It is directed solely against nuclear weapons coming from
outer space; but those arriving from air, land or sea might still destroy
the United States as a functioning society. Second, could the S.D.I. create
an American monopoly of protection against space-delivered weapons?
Hardly, since the Soviet Union would develop its own S.D.I., and both
sides would develop weapons for the destruction of each other's "star
wars" potential. Thirdly, would the scheme reduce the risk of unintended
nuclear war? Since S.D.I. requires staggeringly complex new computer
technology it would virtually exclude human decision-making and detec-
tion of computer errors. Moreover, S.D.I. could not guarantee against a
deliberate first nuclear strike. In a major crisis, S.D.I. could conceivably
induce either side to make a pre-emptive nuclear attack, in the knowledge
that the attacked side's capacity to respond with space-delivered nuclear
weapons would be destroyed.7 8
It is in the context of these considerations that the S.D.I.'s compati-
bility with existing treaty law, the ABM Treaty,79 must be examined. The
ABM Treaty of 1972 is the most important arms control agreement con-
cluded since World War II."0 "ABM remains the only weapons system of
78. For various positions on the S.D.I., see also UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, AP-
PEAL TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO BAN SPACE WEAPONS (May, 1985),
(signed by 54 Nobel laureates, a majority of members of the National Academy of Sciences,
and many other scientists) ; Ball, The War for Star Wars, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, April 11,
1985; Bethe, Garwin, Gottfried, Kendall, Space-based Ballistic Missile Defense, 194 SCIEN-
TIFIC AMERICAN 39-49 (1949); Boyle, Star Wars vs. International Law: The Force Will Be
Against Us 6 ACDIS BULL. 2 (1985).
79. ABM Treaty, May 26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No.
7503.
80. For the texts and histories of negotiations of the agreements aiming at arms control
and disarmament, concluded since 1945 and in force for the United States, see U.S. ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, (1980).
For an insider's analysis "of the initiatives and actions taken within the United Nations on
the question of non-use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war" from 1946 to
the 1982 General Assembly 2nd Special Session on Disarmament (which also shows the ob-
stacles the United Nations has been facing due to attitudes of Member States) see Cor-
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significance to be effectively limited in the arms-control negotiations."'"
The U.S - U.S.S.R. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, as the prefix "Anti"
shows, is opposed to weapons designed to protect either nation's territory
against attack. Its philosophy is based on the lessons of the 1960's, which
indicate that such defense cannot be truly effective, but that their build-
up nevertheless nourishes the suspicion of an intention to start a war.
Instead, consonant with the deterrence doctrine, the Treaty expresses the
philosophy that strategic stability requires an equal vulnerability; neither
would attack the other, as the consequences would be unacceptable to
both.
The key stipulation of the ABM Treaty reads: "Each party under-
takes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which
are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based." 2 Thus the
Treaty prohibits not only the deployment and, implicitly, the use of ABM
weapons, but also their development and testing.
The Treaty proves the parties' earnest intent to prevent its demise.
Thus, it shows a calm attitude toward potential infractions. For instance,
the treaty states that "ABM systems or their components prohibited by
this Treaty shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures
within the shortest possible agreed period of time." 3 In other words, such
matters are to be disposed of amicably. Also, in contrast to the time-re-
stricted validity of other arms control agreements, such as SALT I and II,
the ABM Treaty stipulates that it "shall be of unlimited duration." 4
Nevertheless, the Treaty provides for emergency situations: "Each
Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to with-
draw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to
the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme inter-
ests."8' 5 The prerogative to withdraw from the Treaty, then, depends on
three conditions: (a) events must have occurred which, in the withdrawing
Party's judgment, were "extraordinary"; (b) the extraordinary events
must, in the withdrawing Party's judgment, have been so grave to have
"jeopardized its supreme interests," and (c) these events must be related
to antiballistic missile matters. This third condition excludes the right to
radini, Prevention of Nuclear War: The Multilateral Approach, DISARMAMENT, A PERIODIC
REVIEW BY THE UNITED NATIONS 32,52 (Summ. 1983).
81. Krell, On the theory of Armaments Dynamics, in ARMAMENTS, ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT 117 (M. Thee ed. 1981).
82. The treaty permitted two carefully restricted types of non-mobile land-based ABM
installations (hense its title as "limitation" instead of "prohibition" of ABM systems): the
deployment of specified numbers of ABM launchers, ABM missiles and ABM radar com-
plexes within a specified radius around Washington, D.C. and Moscow, and analogous by
specified ABM installations in one additional area of each country (art. III). A 1974 Per-
otocol to the Treaty reduced the number of those areas from two to one in each country.
ABM Treaty, supra note 79.
83. Id. art. VIII.
84. Id. art XV, para. 1.
85.- Id. art XV, para 2.
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base the withdrawal on any other grounds. Linkage to extraordinary
events unconnected with anti-ballistic weapons matters may not be
invoked.
Furthermore, the withdrawal must not be abrupt. Notice of the deci-
sion to withdraw has to be given "six months prior to withdrawal from
the Treaty"."6 The cooling-off period could permit bilateral negotiations,
as well as third-party efforts (e.g., by the parties' allies and/or the United
Nations), to prevent the withdrawal and thus avoid a serious deteriora-
tion of the international climate and a new arms race.
Finally, "[s]uch notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary
events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme in-
terests. '1 7 The notice of withdrawal must make a convincing case that can
stand outside scrutiny. Withdrawal from a bilateral treaty by either Party
terminates the treaty, which is the reason why the ABM Treaty sur-
rounds the right of withdrawal with strict conditions. The pursuit of the
S.D.I. without a formal withdrawal from the ABM Treaty may indicate
the wish of the United States not to be considered as causing the Treaty's
dissolution. But, since it conflicts with the essence of the Treaty, the
S.D.I. entitles the Soviets to terminate the Treaty themselves.8 In any
case, the ABM Treaty, as it stands, cannot survive the S.D.I., nor does
any prospect exist for a U.S.-Soviet agreement to amend the Treaty.
Indeed, the fact that the S.D.I. does not expect to make nuclear
weapons obsolete, but that it is to be combined with preparations for
their offensive use, came to public knowledge in May of 1985. Reporting
on Washington's "most extensive review of the nuclear policy in ten
years", a New York Times dispatch stated:
The Defense Department is devising a nuclear war plan and command
structure that would integrate offensive nuclear weapons with the pro-
jected anti-missile shield .... Until now, the United States has relied
solely on offensive weapons such as missiles, as a nuclear deterrence.
It is the prospect of the shield and the preconceived need to coordi-
nate these two elements that has prompted the current review....
In addition, the United States has begun to field an array of new nu-
clear weapons, including the B-1 bomber, Trident submarines armed
with ballistic missiles, the Pershing-2 medium range ballistic missile,
and cruise missiles based on land, sea and air.... [Tihe new plan is
intended to coordinate the potential use of these weapons, plus others
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states: "A material breach of a
bilateral treaty by one of the Parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for
terminating the treaty or suspending its operations in whole or in part."(art. 60, para. 1) A
material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of this article, consists in... (b) the violation of
a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty."(art. 60,
para. 3) Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 3 9/27 (1969).
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still being developed, with the shield ... "
Three months later, "[t]he White House announced that, despite So-
viet objections, the U.S. would proceed with the first American test of an
anti-satellite weapon against an object in space." 90
The large numbers of orbiting satellites are the superpowers' indis-
pensable eyes and ears for their command and control of communication
and intelligence networks. The side deprived of its satellites would be in a
disastrously inferior situation. Were both sides deprived of them, com-
plete chaos would result.
Since "satellite-killers" are not anti-ballistic missiles, neither their
development nor their testing or deployment is prohibited by the ABM
Treaty. However, the technology of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons is so
much identical with that of anti-ballistic missiles that tests of ASAT
weapons would simultaneously test anti-ballistic missiles, and must there-
fore also be considered forbidden. All in all, the pursuit of the S.D.I.
scheme not only violates the ABM Treaty, but erects no barrier against
nuclear war.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The collision course toward nuclear war can only be diverted by re-
membering and following the reasonable and rational rules of conduct set
by international law. If the evil threatened by nuclear war is laid side by
side with these legal norms it is hard to see how they could permit nu-
clear war.
Respect for law is more important for human survival and well-being
than is the perfection of technology. If the human mind was able to split
the atom, it must be able to concentrate efforts to split the fascination
with the pernicious offspring of that feat - the path toward nuclear catas-
trophe. Practicable, carefully designed proposals for reversing the trend
exist. Based on years of study and thorough discussion, the most compre-
hensive list of the measures available and in principle agreeable to all
Members of the United Nations is contained in the "Program of Action"
enunciated by consensus in the Final Document of the 1978 General As-
sembly Special Session on Disarmament.- Various additional construc-
tive proposals are to be found in other General Assembly resolutions, in
formal statements by groups of World leaders, and in the conclusions
reached by highly respected personalities such as those of the Pugwash
89. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1985, at A-8.
90. N.Y. Times, Aug 21, 1985, at 1, 8. Concerning some planned future tests of S.D.I.
Weapons, see, J. Smith. 'Star Wars' Tests and the ABM Treaty, 229 SCIENCE, July 5, 1985,
at 29.
91. The Consensus Declaration of the Special Session states: "Mankind is confronted
with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation."
U.N. Department of Public Information, Final Document of the Special Session of the
General Assembly on Disarmament (May-July 1978) at 10-19.
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group. Yet, who will be left to be blamed, and by whom, if the counsel of
reason is disregarded?
